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wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/mde164The theory of the marketing firm locates the rationale of the modern business enter-
prise that lies in its responding profitably to the imperatives of marketing orientation.
Economic theories of the firm generally fail to recognize these imperatives, enhanced
consumer choice and sophistication, which entail marketing orientation as the ratio-
nale of the firm. The paper propose a competence theory of the firm as a
metacontingency and examines the bilateral contingencies by which firms link to their
consumerates, which indicate their capacities for customer orientation. The marketing
firm emerges as a means of encapsulating entrepreneurship, economizing on transac-
tion costs, and enabling the management of marketing specialization.Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the
interest of the producer ought to be attended to only so far as it
may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer.
Adam Smith. 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth
of Nations. London: Methuen & Co (Book IV, chapter 8, 49)
1 | INTRODUCTION
Theories of the firm are preoccupied with what firms are and why they
exist. At its simplest, in the neoclassical conception, a firm is a produc-
tion function; at perhaps its most complex, it is a nexus of contractual
and noncontractual relationships, multilateral interactions, and systems
of communication and authority. The idea of the firm in economic the-
ory conveys a unit that produces rather than consumes, as compared
with the household which consumes but does not produce: Between
them, they provide a means of coordination consisting of “imperson-
ally determined market prices and personally defined tastes” (Demsetz,
2014, p. 8.) It is entirely possible that a firm in this sense could be a
one‐person operation rather than an organization1; in which case,
the question transforms into that of explaining why firms‐as‐organiza-
tions exist and accomplish what they do. As Penrose (2009, p. 31) por-
trays it, the firm is more than “a collection of productive resources”: It
is also “an administrative organization.”2 Recognizing that it is an
administrative organization, the raison d'être of which is the profitable- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Minkes (1924–2018), mentor andsatisfaction of consumer wants; this paper seeks the rationale of the
contemporary firm in an environment that predominantly comprises
marketing considerations. For the critical issue is how production and
consumption interact.
Although it would be facile to imagine that economists have ignored
the consumer's being the mainspring of productive activity, theories of
the firm seem often to permit this observation no more than the status
of a foundational truism rather than that of a central explanatory com-
ponent. Yet what Adam Smith said so elegantly almost two and a half
centuries ago is now of enhanced significance, for the contemporary
firm faces competitive and demand conditions that stem from unprece-
dented levels of consumer choice and consumer sophistication. As a
result, its rationale, modus operandi, and effect must be understood in
their light. This is the task of the theory of the marketing firm.
No current economic theory of the firm is based on the understand-
ing that the consumer interest is paramount or that marketing‐oriented
management is the justification of the business, and why, or that recog-
nizes marketing transactions as the central defining characteristic of the
firm. No economic theory recognizes that the modern firm is a
metacontingency whose output is the marketing mix and that upon this
rests its fortunes, and certainly no theory attempts to trace the implica-
tions of the imperatives of marketing‐oriented management. A theory of
the marketing firm must, in addition to recognizing the imperatives of
marketing‐oriented management, explain what it is that marketing firms
do that makes them distinctive both from other concepts of the firm and
from organizations not designated firms at all. Whereas the account of
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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FOXALL 165the imperatives of marketing‐oriented management is descriptive of the
conditions that modern firms face, the account of what marketing firms
do that follows recounts the managerial and strategic requirements that
such firms would have to fulfill in order to survive and prosper under
these conditions. It does not seek to put forward a blueprint for corpo-
rate action: That is the job of performance theories that trace the for-
tunes of actual companies as they operationalize the necessity to
respond appropriately to the imperatives. Rather, it is an idealized
account of the action appropriate to the demands of marketing‐oriented
management, a portrayal of the knowledge and decisions that the firm
would require in order to fulfill its strategic obligations. Nor is it, there-
fore, a logical microeconomic theory (e.g., Rubinstein, 2012), any more
than a guide to managerial action, but a behavioral‐economic theory of
essential managerial competence informed by behavioral knowledge of
how firms and consumers operate.
As an economic‐psychological approach3 to the understanding of
modern business enterprise responding to economic and social condi-
tions that mandate customer or marketing orientation as a philosophy
of corporate behavior,4 the theory of the marketing firm seeks to eluci-
date why there are firms, the nature of their boundaries, and how they
should be organized by reference to these conditions and the impera-
tives they place on those responsible for their strategic management.
Its disciplinary base includes the economics of transaction costs (Coase,
1937; Williamson, 1975, 1985), principal and agent interaction and the
firm as an assemblage of contacts (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976), entrepreneurship (e.g., Holcombe, 2007; Kirzner,
1973; Sautet, 2000), productive specialization (e.g., Bylund, 2016),
information encapsulation (e.g., Holcombe, 2013, 2014), and the sepa-
ration theory of the firm (Spulber, 2009a). This microeconomic base is
supplemented by behavioral psychology and marketing thought.
The paper pursues a competence theory of the firm as an idealized
marketing entity. Chomsky (1957, 1965) distinguishes competence theo-
ries of language from performance theories. The first refers to knowledge
of the rules of language; the second, to the manifest use of language in
actual situations. In this context, a competence theory is concerned with
the structure of rules of grammar a person would ideally need to know in
order to speak a language, whereas a performance theory involves itself
with the ways in which everyday speech occurs in the process of inter-
personal communication. Dennett (1978) has employed this distinction
in his approach to the theory of mind to distinguish between mentalistic
explanations of idealized systems in which the predictors of behavior are
intentions such as desires and beliefs and which derive their credibility
from the instrumental capacity of these entities to predict and psycholog-
ical explanations that are empirically testable against data. I employ the
idea of a competence theory in this paper to refer to an idealized view
of how a firm would need to behave in order to respond successfully to
the social and economic factors that suggest that corporate performance
is dependent on the pursuit of a strategy of customer orientation. The
theory seeks to identify the information needs and consequent decisions
of a firm pursuing marketing‐oriented management.
The structure of the argument is as follows. The paper first examines
several economic theories of the firm and argues that, despite their
insights into production, they are preoccupiedwith intrafirm perspectivesand deficient in their failing to consider the realities of consumer choice
and sophistication in which inhere the imperatives of marketing‐oriented
management. The marketing firm is presented as a response to these
contingencies in which a company‐wide philosophy of customer orienta-
tion is the prerequisite of corporate survival and profitability. On this
basis, an alternative theory of the firm based onmarketing considerations
is proposed, which identifies the entrepreneurial process as consisting in
the strategic conversion of market information into marketing intelli-
gence and strategic knowledge, and the argument is made that this pro-
cess must be encapsulated within firms for competitive reasons.
Entrepreneurial encapsulation of strategic decision making, therefore,
provides the basis of the rationale of the marketing firm.2 | RATIONALES OF THE FIRM
2.1 | The management of transaction costs
The question of why there are firms antedates Coase's, 1937 paper,5
but his thesis that firms exist in order to economize transaction costs
has become a classic contribution to the theory of the firm. In a nutshell,
the entrepreneur who attempts to coordinate productive activities
through price information provided by the market finds that obtaining
and using such information entail costs. When these costs of using
the market, transaction costs, reach a certain level, there may be advan-
tages in the entrepreneur's incorporating the activities within a man-
aged system, the firm, wherein coordination is based on planning and
administration rather than market prices. The import of Coase's thesis
is that resources may be allocated other than through the price mecha-
nism; resource allocation may be effected by the exercise of managerial
authority within firms, notably those large enough to take on the neces-
sary tasks of planning and coordination. Incorporation is probable when
internalizing tasks allows them to be fulfilled more economically than
multiple contractingwithin the decentralizedmarket place. In particular,
the costs of transacting business via the price mechanism, the costs for
instance of discovering what prices are available, and of writing and
policing contracts to govern transactingmay be reduced by the employ-
ment of managerial authority within an organization. When transaction
or marketing costs can be reduced by the supersession of the market,
the tasks that incur them are likely to be undertaken by firms. Coase
assumes that the operation of the firm's internal market mirrors that
of the external market (Bylund, 2016, pp. 15–16.)
Williamson (1975) bases his theory of transaction cost analysis on
the behavioral principles of bounded rationality (Simon, 1976, 1987)
and opportunism that he defines as “self‐interest seeking with guile.”
Williamson is concerned primarily with “maladaptation costs” that
arise when gaps in long‐term contracts necessitate reformulation and
realignment of contractual relationships: Vertical integration occurs
when either the need for these tasks can be obviated or conducted
at lower cost under internal organization than in the market not least
because internalization makes possible the settling of issues by fiat.
Incorporation also facilitates the monitoring of contracts and pro-
motes loyalty and cooperation via the encapsulation within firms of
FOXALL166human and nonhuman assets relevant to the transaction (Williamson,
1975). For Williamson, the focus has become that of economizing
the totality of transaction and production costs, and he is careful to
distinguish the types of transaction involved (see Bylund, 2016, p.
62). Hence, internal organization is less costly than market organiza-
tion as a result of three forces: the frequency of transactions that
increases transaction costs, uncertainty over transactions, and the
specificity of the assets required for transacting; all of which may
engender opportunistic behavior on the part of one or other of the
parties involved.2.2 | Management of authority relations and nexus
of contracts
The multiperson firm involves issues of agency and conflict of interest
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). These authors emphasize, first, that coop-
eration is enhanced when it is accomplished by the organization of
teams rather than when it is based on the association of individual
efforts within the market and, second, that team organization entails
difficulties arising from the allocation of tasks and assumption of
responsibility for actions on which the success of the entire team
depends (Demsetz, 2014, pp. 16–17). Individual team members may
act opportunistically to shirk effort; as Demsetz puts it, “the difficult
problem of productivity apportionment among synergistically
interacting team members makes team organization especially suscep-
tible to shirking problems” (p. 19).
Output can be increased if it is undertaken jointly, and doing so
within the confines of the firm makes possible the monitoring of effort
and reduces the problem of shirking workers who benefit from the
efforts of others while minimizing their own productive involvement.
In other words, the firm makes principal–agent relationships manage-
able. The election of a manager to oversee the working arrangements
of all laborers reduces free riding and ensures that each employee's
wages are closely related to the marginal productivity of their output.
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) emphasize that relationships within the
firm between principal and agent are contractual, just like those of a
consumer to a tradesperson. In the consumption case, there is no
question of authority, only the capacity of either party to the contract
to refuse to trade further with the other. Firms likewise have no
authority or fiat over their workers any more than the consumer has
over the retailer.
Mention must also be made here, albeit briefly, of the view of the
firm as a multiplicity of contracts with its stakeholders, including share-
holders, directors, employees, customers, and suppliers (Easterbrook &
Fischel, 1991; Hart, 1995). Prior to Alchian and Demsetz's (1972) anal-
ysis and the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), the tendency of eco-
nomic theory was to analyze microeconomic behavior at the level of
the market. Thereafter, the emphasis shifted to the analysis of
intrafirm behavior. Rather than the firm being treated as a black box,
it could now be opened up to the analysis provided by neoclassicism
(Bratton, 1989). The firm was no longer a unitary actor: It became a
coalition of interests that could be investigated through the law andeconomics perspectives of contracting, even though according to
some critics, this meant that the firm as an entity became entirely fic-
tional (see, e.g., Langlois, 2016; Mäntysaari, 2012; Orts, 2012).2.3 | The management of productive specialization
This approach derives from the pioneering work of Bylund (2016)
whose strategy is based on the view that, “If the firm is production,
then we should be able to find the essence of what the firm is by
studying the type of production that is undertaken within it” (Bylund,
2016, p. 3), which necessitates an analytical depiction of production
under differing means of coordination. The initial stage entails special-
ized production in the absence of firms; the purpose of which is to
locate limitations in production that indicate how the advent of the
firm enables a solution. In other words, the firm provides the allevia-
tion of a problem that the market cannot cope with. Bylund is entirely
open to firms' also economizing on transaction costs and permitting
the monitoring of effort in team production, but his theory points to
a more fundamental role of the firm, namely, its solving the problem
of what he terms “the specialization deadlock.”
The specialization deadlock, in the decentralized market (i.e., one
with no firms), refers to a situation in which there is incompatibility
between the outputs of successive stages of a productive process as
a result of increased division of labor that eventuates in items for which
there is no market support. As long as workers all produce specialized
items that are usable in the successive stage of production, the prob-
lem does not arise: In the example provided by Bylund, a producer of
steel can obtain the iron and coal required through market transac-
tions; moreover, this steel producer can trade the finished steel
wrought by his productive processes with a motor manufacturer. Such
a decentralized market, marked by autonomous producers at each
stage, results from the output of each productive stage being accom-
plished by many competitors, given that there are also competing
applications for the intermediate goods. As long as the three produc-
tive stages (1, iron and coal production; 2, steel production; and 3,
automobile manufacture) are concluded each in its entirety, there is
no problem of incompleteness: The output of Stage 1 is the input of
Stage 2; the output of stage 2, that of stage 3. But if a producer special-
izes in the first half of Stage 2 and tries to sell it externally, there will be
no market for its output; similarly, to specialize in the second half of
Stage 2 means there will be no customer because motor manufacturers
require the output of Stage 2 to have been completed. A producer at
Stage 2 may wish to specialize in this way in order to effect a more effi-
cient division of labor, perhaps through additional investment in capital
goods.6 But the market does not support such a move: The resulting
incompleteness of a production procedure is apparent from the inabil-
ity of the market to absorb it. In Smith's famous saying, the division of
labor is limited by the extent of the market, or as Bylund (2016, p. 6)
puts it, “One cannot individually specialise further than what is already
implemented in the market so that inputs can be acquired and outputs
are saleable in the existing market.”
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would, if the extramarket specialization it entails was engaged in, signifi-
cantly increase uncertainty. The lack of appropriate prices would
require exhaustive coordination, which is expensive in the decentralized
market, and this would inhibit if not eliminate the possibility of individ-
uals' seeking economic efficiency through further productive specializa-
tion, contenting themselves with the degree of specialization that is
supported by existing market conditions. The resolution of the situation
is achieved by the device of the firm that can embody the increased
specialization that the market cannot support. Rather than economizing
transaction costs, the economic role firm in solving this problem of
production emerges from an innovative approach to production that
enables concentrated specialization. Indeed, “The firm, as it here
emerges, is an island of specialisation that must be formed outside the
extent of the market. It is the observable result of an innovation in
production that uses specialisation of a degree and kind that is impossi-
ble to establish in the market (that is, through the price mechanism”
(Bylund, 2016, p. 7).2.4 | Entrepreneurial encapsulation
The entrepreneur in neoclassical microeconomics is both the owner and
manager of the firm. However, given the concentration on states of
equilibrium in the neoclassical model of the firm, the absence of change,
there is little for the occupant of these roles to do. The firm is a price
taker that generates a single product for which there is an assured mar-
ket; consumers' tastes are invariable; perfect knowledge is obtained;
and the firm, like every other firm, inescapably earns a “normal” profit.
The entrepreneur is thus spared the necessity of having to make deci-
sions by the theoretically prescribed contingencies of reinforcement
that define the market in equilibrium. This state of affairs, which
obviates the need for decision making, innovation, or marketing, is
firmly rejected by economists of the Austrian school (Hayek, 1949;
Kirzner, 1973; Menger, 1976; Sautet, 2000; vonMises, 2016) for whom
the presumption of omniscience, the unnecessity of innovation, and the
static conditions of production are entirely at odds with the realities of
the economic system as it exists. Far from equilibrium being the norm,
markets are constantly in flux and entrepreneurs discover opportunities
for novelty in order to profit. The essence of entrepreneurship in this
account lies in surprise and discovery, the alertness to the possibility
of profiting through arbitrage, and thus achieving the returns due to
the first mover (Kirzner, 1980.) Both calculation and management are,
on this view, absent from entrepreneurship.
The Austrian perspective is much closer to the idea of business
development and creative enterprise inherent in modern strategic
management and marketing as well as recent contributions to the the-
ory of the firm. Drucker (1977, 2007), for instance, argues that
marketing and innovation are the sole functions of the business orga-
nization; the objective of which is to create a customer. Entrepreneur-
ship remains, however, a “special” function. For Penrose (2009, p. 31),
“Entrepreneurial services are those contributions to the operations of
a firm which relate to the introduction and acceptance on behalf ofthe firm of new ideas, particularly with respect to products ….” She
contrasts entrepreneurship on this definition with managerial services,
consisting as they do in “the execution of entrepreneurial ideas and
proposals and the supervision of existing operations.” Crucially, how-
ever, she notes that the same individuals may be involved in the pro-
vision of both kinds of service, a point to which I shall return.7
Entrepreneurship, seen as so decisive a mainspring of economic
activity, requires protection from competitors. Also writing in the Aus-
trian tradition, Holcombe (2007, 2013, 2014) stresses that entrepre-
neurial action requires internalization as it is a matter of securing
personal or corporate advantage, and that first exist as “repositories
of knowledge,” knowledge that is necessarily tacit and decentralized.
By preventing its availability to competitors but also retaining tacit
understanding of production and marketing among those who can
make effective use of it, the firm serves to encapsulate innovative
knowledge and, indeed, entrepreneurship itself. Holcombe is making
more than an abstract point here. There are tangible benefits to the
firm that can safely make decisions to acquire productive inputs rather
than generate them in‐house because it has trust in the ability of a
supplier to secure and safeguard vital tacit knowledge. The frequently
febrile relationships between firms can, therefore, be an important
determinant of the success or failure of an interorganizational affilia-
tion. An additional rationale of the firm inheres, then, in entrepreneurs'
ability to operate within these business organizations by virtue of their
being knowledge repositories. Firms are differentiated by the speciali-
zation of their tacit knowledge, and according to Holcombe, this helps
maintain tacit knowledge within their boundaries. This is realized in
the ability of entrepreneurial innovation to increase profits, and this
is why entrepreneurs benefit from organizing their activities within
firms. The organization of production within firms enables the entre-
preneur to benefit maximally from innovations due to tacit knowledge.2.5 | The separation criterion
In his recent theory of the firm, Spulber (2009a) builds on the transac-
tion costs perspective, arguing that the import or rationale of the firm
lies in its capacity to effect more economic exchanges by means of its
intermediation than would be possible through direct exchanges
between consumers: “Firms play an economic role when
intermediated exchange is more efficient than direct exchange”
(Spulber, 2009a, p. 11) In this framework, intermediated exchange is
exchange between consumers that is transacted through firms.
Spulber is unusual in placing consumers at the inauguration of his the-
ory of the firm, observing that consumers found firms when this
makes their transactions more efficient than carrying them out directly
with other consumers. Since “[a] transaction is the creation of value by
voluntary cooperation between two or more economic units” (p. 12),
the value of a transaction consists in transaction benefits minus trans-
action costs; there is, therefore, an incentive to create a mechanism, a
transaction institution, that reduces the latter.
The rationale of firms in this theory of the firm is more radical than
this opening proposition suggests, however. Spulber's (2009a, p. 63)
FOXALL168cardinal definitional point casts the firm as “a transaction institution
whose objectives differ from those of its owners.” So, among the
numerous forms the firm can take, “Corporations are firms because
their objectives are distinct from those of their shareholders who are
only concerned with their residual returns. Sole proprietorships and
wholly owned enterprises are firms when they operate with objectives
that are separate from the consumption objectives of their owners.
Entrepreneurial startups often are not firms because their objectives
are intertwined with those of the entrepreneur. Therefore, firms can
take many forms including corporations, close corporations, sole pro-
prietorships, and limited‐liability partnerships. This is a question of
the economic functions of the institution rather than the many legal
labels that describe business enterprises” (Spulber, 2009b, p. 303.)
Not only does this criterion allow for the separation of ownership
and control, the separation criterion serves also to distinguish the firm
from what Spulber calls consumer organizations that would include
groups of contracting individuals, clubs, cooperatives (whether of
workers or buyers), nonprofit organizations, basic partnerships, chari-
ties, and public organizations. In none of these cases does the objective
of the organization differ from those of its owners. Perhaps more con-
ventionally, the rationale of firms is found also in the economic role
performed when “intermediated” exchange, which involves firms rather
than going straight from consumer to consumer, improves on the effi-
ciency that can be provided direct exchange from consumer to
consumer in the absence of a firm (Spulber, 2009a, p. 11.)3 | BEYOND PRODUCTION ORIENTATION
Several of the insights provided by these standpoints will be apparent
in the theory of the marketing firm. However, two tendencies must be
noted before proceeding to this. These are the predomination of con-
siderations that arise from production rather than those that involve
consumption, and the intrafirm restriction of the scope of entrepre-
neurship. In addition, two omissions of economic theories of the firm
require attention: the recent findings of the economic psychology of
consumer behavior, which clarifies what it is that consumers do and,
in particular, what they buy and consume, and the socioeconomic
developments of affluent economies since the mid‐20th century,
which enjoin marketing orientation on firms. These four consider-
ations provide a route to the elucidation of the nature and functions
of the marketing firm.3.1 | Prominence of production
Although there are clear differences among the perspectives reviewed,
several appear to be inward‐looking views of the firm, introspective—
introverted, even—confining the boundaries of the firm to its legal limits.
Coase's firm is principally a unit of production. It is a reflection of its
time, an era when marketing considerations, though in development,
were still not central to most firms. The firm of which Coase wrote and
which dominated the landscape of his time was principally concerned
with production; this was, after all, the age of innovations inmanufacturing such as the automation of assembly lines. Competition
was among firms in the same industry and, in a sense, over time, within
the factory. It is not surprising that this firm was dominated by the need
to economize on factor input costs, at a time when customer demand
exceeded the capacity to supply it.8 AlthoughWilliamson's firm belongs
to a later era when marketing considerations were much more to the
fore, it is still primarily a unit of production. The perspective is in some
respects wider than that of Coase, behaviorally more sophisticated,
and explorative of the points at which internalization becomes prefera-
ble to market transacting. But the overall impression remains one of
emphasis on the imperatives of internalization and on the specificity
of assets involved in production. The emphasis of the principal–agent
and nexus of contracting approaches remains one of internal organiza-
tion rather than external entrepreneurial strategy.9
Bylund's direction of gaze is also primarily on production, a theme
that authors of theories of the firm have failed to address in sufficient
depth. Specialization deadlock arises “… when [productive] tasks are
actively split and thereby necessitate new and previously unseen spe-
cializations that are unsupported by the existing production structure
and, consequently, the market” (Bylund, 2016, p. 84). Bylund is, how-
ever, writing within the Austrian tradition that recognizes the volatility
of markets. For all his emphasis rests on the internal operations of,
first, producers within a decentralized system of coordination and,
second, firms, he recognizes crucially that production decisions are
ultimately dependent for their effectiveness on what the market will
tolerate. Firms are nonetheless a solution to “the problem of produc-
tion,” whereas innovation is something that takes place within the pro-
ductive capacity of the firm. Given the emphasis on intraorganizational
process innovation, the role of the entrepreneur is apparently confined
to solving the specialization deadlock through changing the
internal arrangements of the firm. It is a production that defines the
firm, a production that encompasses its operations including entrepre-
neurship, and a production that we must understand better in order to
define the firm and know what it does. By contrast, the kinds of spe-
cialization emphasized in the managerial/strategy literatures is con-
cerned with the dynamics of product‐market scope and diversification
(e.g., Ansoff, 1986; Ansoff et al., 2019; Lynch, 2015; Penrose, 2009).
This is an extravert perspective in which the role of the entrepreneur
is the external search for product‐market opportunities.
Spulber (2009a) is unusual in considering consumers as the starting
point of the theory of the firm. This is, as noted, of particular value in
his arriving at a definition of the firm. But Spulber's preoccupation is
how consumers form firms and act as owners, rather than the vital role
consumers play in determining the rationale of the firm, the existence,
and behavior of the marketing firm, which are central to the present
concern. The consumer as the raison d'être of the firm is surprisingly
absent from or deemphasized by this, as by most theories of the firm.
Existing theories do not embrace the implications ofmarketing‐oriented
management nor do their firms practice marketing in any modern sense.
At best, they concentrate on selling, an orientation that stresses the
firm's interests rather than the consumer's; at its worst, it is the deploy-
ment of persuasive sales management to induce customers to buy
whatever the firm happens to produce. By contrast, marketing‐oriented
FOXALL 169management takes the customer's viewpoint as paramount: The pro-
ducer's interest is served by its discerning consumer wants and
responding to them profitably. Moreover, the marketing‐oriented firm
responds to the marketplace. It is entrepreneurial, though not entirely
in ways that are not emphasized by the perspectives on entrepreneur-
ship considered thus far (see, e.g., Webb, Ireland, Hitt, Kistruck, &
Tihanyi, 2011).3.2 | Restriction of entrepreneurial scope
There are several aspects of the treatment of entrepreneurship in
economic theories of the firm that are problematic in the context of
understanding modern, especially large‐scale, business enterprises as
they are encountered. Not all of the theories described above are
equally committed to the following views, though these are continuing
characteristics of several corporate theories. These are, first, the con-
finement of the role of the entrepreneur to the start‐up phase of the
firm; second, the strict separation between entrepreneurship and man-
agement, as in the definition of entrepreneurship as discovery marked
by surprise and the exclusion of search and calculation; and, third, the
confinement of entrepreneurship to intrafirm productive innovation
and consequent neglect of product and marketing innovation.
By contrast, the strategic management literature and case analyses
of actual firms reveal the role of entrepreneurship in the established
firm as the dispersal of entrepreneurship throughout the organization
(Minkes & Foxall, 1980, 1982.) Although entrepreneurship of course
operates as Spulber describes, placing an exclusive emphasis on this
route would be to ignore entrepreneurship as a process that is dif-
fused throughout the established firm (Foxall & Minkes, 1996; Minkes
& Foxall, 2000, 2003). Moreover, the observation of entrepreneurial
activities in firms suggests that it is a process in which both entrepre-
neurial services and managerial services (as Penrose describes them)
play a part. Penrose, as we have seen, notes that the same managers
may perform both roles, and it is inconceivable that in practice, these
roles do not interact and cross‐fertilize. It is possible to draw too fine a
distinction between entrepreneurship and other facets of managerial
contribution. We are surely not assuming that entrepreneurship, of
all human areas of performance, is autonomous; we must accordingly
conclude that discovery, and surprise can be the result of search and
evaluation as much as of anything else. Discovery and surprise may
be the outcome of the search and evaluation procedures, but they
might well not occur at all in the absence of the preceding exploration
and calculation. This does not make them the same thing; rather, it
recognizes that entrepreneurial awareness may require, and often
does require, the pursuit of marketing intelligence and its analysis.
The confinement of entrepreneurship to discovery is not universal.
Holcombe (2007, p. 29), for instance, defines entrepreneurship as
“the act of observing an unexploited profit opportunity and then
exploiting it,” noting that Kirzner's understanding is restricted to the
former. Entrepreneurship is, therefore, as necessary to the established
firm as to the start‐up and comprises the selection of opportunities to
realize the opportunities for profit offered by management of thestrategic scope of the firm where this is defined by the marketing mixes
the firm can support and the consumerates10 it seeks to serve with
them. This is consistent with the view that the firm is a means by
which entrepreneurs address the problems of coordination that arise
from variation and ambiguity (Holcombe, 2013; Langlois, 2007).
Indeed, the defining emphasis on surprise as the essence of entre-
preneurship according to Austrian interpretations flies in the face of
modern marketing realities.11 Innovation may be discontinuous
(stressing its surprising element) but also relatively continuous and still
be competitively crucial. The essence of entrepreneurship for the most
part is surely the recognition of opportunity rather than surprise per
se. To define entrepreneurship entirely in terms of the surprise ele-
ment and to leave out the calculation is to overlook the role of strat-
egy formulation in firms and the whole process of new product
development that may entail surprise at any stage. The new product
development process is, moreover, essential to the final element of
surprise, which is necessary for strategic decision making. The ratio-
nale of the contemporary firm rests in part on entrepreneurship, and
this is largely encompassed by the whole procedure of new product
development in the cause of management of strategic scope (Foxall,
1984). The strategic purview of this kind of firm embraces fully the
implications of innovation and marketing‐oriented management.
There is a further implication of this approach. Entrepreneurship is
not only a preliminary to enterpriseful and innovative activity; it is a
post hoc judgment on the success of an enterprise. Alternatively, we
might say that entrepreneurship may be understood in its potential
for profitable action and in the extent to which this is realized. We
do not know that the insight of the would‐be entrepreneur, be it an
individual or an organization, is actually entrepreneurial until we can
ascertain the effects of the action that followed the initial “entrepre-
neurial alertness.” Entrepreneurship is adjudged via accomplishment
(Foxall, 1984).3.3 | Consumer behavior analysis
The rationale of the marketing firm recognizes that marketing is logi-
cally prior to production. This does not mean that it can always pre-
cede it temporally, but it acknowledges that the acceptance at the
stage of consumer choice is essential if the productive process is to
be commercially successful. We have seen that this thinking is inher-
ent in Bylund's argument that the market ultimately determines the
efficacy of productive innovations. The suggestion in some marketing
texts that market research will always precede production flies in the
face of commercial realities in which firms are usually committed to
some form of technology and production before business develop-
ment occurs. Nor, notwithstanding the sophistication of the tech-
niques that compose the new product development process, can
consumers themselves always be of assistance in predicting their
future wants and purchasing behavior (Foxall, 1984). But the logic of
the situation that must underpin a competence theory of marketing
is the truism that that consumption is the ultimate arbiter of commer-
cial success and recognizes that firms that do not attempt prescience
FOXALL170with respect to the market may be foreordaining disappointment. The
first requirement of an understanding of the nature of the marketing
firm is, therefore, to understand what consumers buy Foxall, 2017b.
Recent research based in consumer behavior analysis has sought to
elucidate this. There are three reasons for the use of this psychological
paradigm. First, it has provided the foundations of a theory of consumer
behavior (e.g., Foxall, 2010), and therefore, its employment within the
theory of the marketing firm enables the unification of two strands of
marketing theory that are often pursued separated and in disparate
terms, namely, consumer psychology and marketing management. Sec-
ond, it is compatible with microeconomics and thereby promotes inter-
disciplinary analysis in terms of operant behavioral economics (Foxall,
2016). Third, it is an element in a larger integrative interdisciplinary
enterprise, which is of relevance to the analysis of corporate behavior,
consumer behavior analysis, which draws upon the theories and findings
of marketing and consumer research (Foxall, 2001, 2002, 2017a).
Behavior analysis explains the rate at which a response is emitted by
an organism in a given context as a function of the kinds of consequence
it generates. A consequence that has the effect of increasing the rate at
which a behavior is performed is a reinforcer, whereas one that
depresses this rate is a punisher. Rate of responding is therefore contin-
gent on the kinds of outcomes similar responses have generated previ-
ously in similar circumstances. This relationship between response and
consequences constitutes “a two‐ term contingency”: R→Sr/p, in which
R is the (behavioral) response and Sr/p denotes the reinforcing or
punishing stimulus that affects its future occurrence. Learning is viewed
as a change in the rate at which a response occurs as a result of prior
reinforcing and punishing effects. The three‐term contingency, which
forms the basic explanatory device in radical behaviorism, summarizes
the role of an antecedent stimulus in the presence of which learning
occurs and which comes to exert control over the emission of the
response, even in the absence of the reinforcing/punishing stimuli that
brought about learning. The three‐term contingency is summarized as
SD→ R→ Sr/p, in which SD is a discriminative stimulus, a stimulus inFIGURE 1 Summative behavioral perspective model. The model is an elab
of responding (R) is a function of the discriminative stimuli (SD) that prefigur
the performance of similar behavior in similar circumstancesthe presence of which an organism performs selectively (or
discriminatively) by emitting a response; R has previously been rein-
forced in the presence of the SD; Sr is a reinforcing stimulus; and Sp is
a punishing stimulus.
We have seen that, in behavior analysis, the probability of a
response is determined by the organism's learning history, the manner
in which the individual's pattern of previous behavior and the outcomes
it has engendered influence current choice. This basic paradigm is elab-
orated in consumer behavior analysis to bring it into service as a means
of predicting and interpreting human economic behavior in naturally
occurring settings (Foxall, 2001, 2002). In the behavioral perspective
model, shown in Figure 1, the immediate precursor of consumer behav-
ior is the consumer situation that represents the interaction of the con-
sumer's learning history and the discriminative stimuli that make up the
current behavior setting (Foxall, 1990, 2016). The essence of the model
is the consumer situation–consumer behavior relationship shown
within the dotted ellipse in Figure 1. In this interaction, the consumer's
experience in similar contexts primes the setting stimuli so that certain
behaviors are made more probable, whereas others are inhibited. Con-
sumer behaviors that are encouraged by the consumer situation are
those that have met with rewarding or reinforcing consequences on
previous consumption occasions, whereas those that are discouraged
are those that have been punished. The consequences of consumer
behavior, that is, its reinforcing and aversive outcomes, are of two kinds:
utilitarian reinforcement and punishment consist in the behavioral con-
sequences that are functionally related to obtaining, owning, and using
an economic product or service, whereas informational reinforcement
and punishment stem from the social and symbolic outcomes of con-
sumption. Consumer behavior is therefore a function of the variables
that make up the current consumer behavior setting insofar as these
prefigure positive and aversive utilitarian and informational conse-
quences of behaving in particular ways. Amore closed consumer behav-
ior setting is one in which one or at most a few behaviors are available
to the consumer, whereas a more open setting is one that presents theoration of the three‐term contingency“SD→ R→ Sr/p—in which the rate
e the rewards (Sr) and punishers (Sp) that have previously accompanied
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sumer behavior is then predictable from the pattern of utilitarian and
informational reinforcement, which the setting variables signal to be
available contingent on the enactment of specific consumer behaviors.
It is central to the argument of this paper to understand what it is
that consumers buy. Although it seems obvious that they buy and con-
sume products and services, economists and other social scientists have
explored the question in finer detail, proposing that they consume bun-
dles of attributes, utilities, satisfactions, and so on. The behavioral
perspective model proposes that they consume reinforcers that supply
both functional and social benefits, that is, utilitarian and informational
reinforcements. In the well‐known Cobb–Douglas utility function,12
economists suggest that consumers purchase various combinations of
products or attributes that maximize their returns or utility within the
confines of their income, their budget constraint. A series of empirical
investigations indicates that what consumers actually maximize is com-
binations of utilitarian and informational reinforcement (Oliveira‐Castro
& Foxall, 2017; Oliveira‐Castro, Cavalcanti, & Foxall, 2015, 2016). This
finding allows us to debate the nature of firms and in particular the
marketing firm.3.4 | Imperatives of marketing‐oriented
management
Marketing‐oriented management is an organization‐wide philosophy
that enjoins upon the entire firm the responsibility of profitably pursu-
ing the fulfillment of customers' requirements. It is not an ideology for
the aggrandizement of the marketing department or function but a
unifying corporate perspective that leads to a distinctive strategy. The
many definitions of strategy emphasize both the seeking of an optimal
harmonization of intrafirm capabilities and external opportunities and
threats, and the need to employ strategy in such a way as to achieve
long‐term prosperity. Andrews (1971, p. 48), for instance, portrays eco-
nomic strategy in terms of “the best match between qualification and
opportunity that positions a firm in its product/market environment,”
whereas the necessary link to profitability and survival is brought out
by Simon and Fassnacht (2019, p. 42): “Strategy is the art and science
of developing and deploying all of a company's resources so as to
achieve the most profitable long‐term survival of the company.” Two
extracorporate influences make this marketing‐oriented management
imperative within this strategic context and within that of a modern
affluent economy: the existence of massive consumer choice and the
advent of a sophisticated consumerate (Foxall, 1981).
Consumer choice is reflected in the vast increase in commodities,
products, and brands available in the market place coupled with an
unprecedented capacity to purchase them. Most consumers have avail-
able to them extremely high levels of discretionary income compared
with any previous age; most marketers face an industrial situation in
which supply or the capacity to supply exceeds demand with the effect
that competitors actively pursue branding strategies intended to
enhance their offerings by increasing consumer involvement in pur-
chasing a given firm's output. Most consumer innovations, albeit themajority are line extensions and continuous new products, are rejected
at the stage of consumer purchasing despite vastly improved tech-
niques of market research, market‐based product testing, and test mar-
keting; estimates agree on a proportion of 80–90%. For industrial
products, estimations agree on a failure rate of approximately 40%. This
picture is the result of high levels of competition not only within tradi-
tional industries but across industry boundaries. Consumer tastes are
dynamic, not only as a result of cultural change and advertising practice,
but because consumers themselves are inventive and innovative. The
result is that it is the customer who is the final arbiter of what business
the firm is in or should be in and, ultimately, of corporate success.
It is well‐known that industrial users tend to be highly knowledge-
able about the products and services they purchase and because it is
feasible and not uncommon for users to coinvent and coinnovate
alongside suppliers. But final consumers are also extremely knowl-
edgeable and experienced with respect to the brands they use, even
if the knowledge us private and tacit. Consumers on the whole are
neither exclusive buyers of a single brand nor random selectors
among all brands in a product category; rather, they practice
multibrand purchasing of a limited repertoire of competing brands
that are functionally interchangeable. Within this tried‐and‐tested
consideration set, consumers are well aware of brand substitutability
and differentials. In many fields, such as computing equipment, many
consumers have considerable knowledge and expertise. As noted,
consumers may be inventive in devising novel uses for existing prod-
ucts and even originating from scratch. Not all consumers fall into
these categories, of course, but there is a sense in which modern con-
sumers are proactive rather than reactive, certainly capable of appreci-
ating comparative advantage when presented with it and of shifting
allegiance among suppliers accordingly. This is a recognition that the
firm must respond to customer behavior rather than seek to mold it.
The consumer is not a passive recipient of marketing mixes; rather,
an active determinant of how physical and social wants will be satis-
fied and thereby of the business the firm is/should be in and thus the
arbiter of the fortunes of the enterprise.
Consumer choice, sophistication, and power are of course relative.
The actual level of consumer discretion reflects the nature of the firm
as a metacontingency and consumers' display of aggregate behavior.
But this potential asymmetry is not absolute; consumer tastes change
and other firms innovate. It is a myopic firm that underrates its
consumerate.
Consumer power includes the capacity to determine what business
the firm is in or should be in. Consumer innovativeness comprises will-
ingness (including spending power) to demand and adopt/reject inno-
vations (which is central to the effectiveness of the productive
process).3.4.1 | Consumer invention
The consumer is part of the productive process: user‐initiated innova-
tion, which carries the implication that consumers can be entrepre-
neurs. These imperatives of marketing‐oriented management make
internal planning of the marketing‐response inevitable if the firm is
13
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marketing assets it requires to compete successfully: These may be
largely intellectual, but they are specialized assets nonetheless and
perform the same function in a theory of the firm as the physical
assets of production.
Discussion of the marketing firm requires that we understand not
only what such an entity does but that we recognize what it is that
makes this organization distinct from others. This latter involves, first,
consideration of the rationale of the marketing firm (including its
objectives and its transactional relationships with other interests)
and, second, its structure as an agent that acts as an entity in its
own right that is involved in the management of a nexus of bilateral
contingencies and that has a specific output in the form of a portfolio
of marketing mixes.4 | THE MARKETING FIRM: FUNDAMENTAL
CONSIDERATIONS
4.1 | Corporate objectives
The marketing firm is that organization which responds to consumer
choice in ways that satisfy both customer requirements and corpo-
rate financial goals. It is obliged by competitive conditions to prac-
tice marketing‐ or customer‐oriented management. Its supreme
purpose is the profitable service of its consumerate, which is the
final arbiter of its success. Marketing‐oriented management has to
be more than the ideology of the marketing function, part of its
attempt to secure resources from other functional areas. It is a
philosophy of the whole organization and needs to be implemented
as such, bringing together the various contributions of the firm's
functions harmoniously and integrating them into an output, the
marketing mix, that fulfills the firm's commercial objectives. Nor is
marketing‐oriented management a discrete operation: As is a view-
point on organization that is pervasive in its implications, it involves
coordination and integration of all the operations of the firm. As a
result, it must saturate every function within the firm: top manage-
ment or policy making, strategic planning, marketing, research and
development, production, finance, human resources, and so on.
This overall strategy of the firm is fulfilled in several ways.
Although Spulber (2009a) argues that firms differ from consumer
organizations in having goals that differ from those of owners, mar-
keting firms may also be distinguished from public enterprise bodies
in (a) facing competition from similar organizations, (b) engaging in
marketing transactions, and (c) using the entire marketing mix rather
than portions of it.
Several candidates have been suggested for the objective of the
firm. Spulber (2009a) proposes profit maximization, a goal which he
says differentiates the firm from its owners, the shareholders. Profit
maximization is acceptable as an idealized objective, but even in a
competence theory, it can be made more concrete. Bounded ratio-
nality (Simon, 1987) suggests that the behavior of the firm may be
intendedly optimizing, but that in reality, this will be limited bycognitive competence. At best, therefore, we can understand the
goal of the firm to be constrained maximization of profit: The firm
will always prefer a higher to a lower profit in the longer term, but
it is impossible to ascertain whether this is the most it could have
achieved. There is no reason, however, to suppose that the firm will
be other than a high‐level satisficer. In Mäntysaari's (2012) theory,
the firm aims at long‐term survival, which is a more tangible objec-
tive to ascertain (note, also its compatibility with the understanding
of strategy put forward by Simon & Fassnacht, 2019). Firms presum-
ably act in order to ensure their survival but it is the qualifier “long
term” here that suggests an equivalence with profit maximization.
Long‐term survival means more than the avoidance of loss if only
because capital investment is likely to rely on retained earnings. Sur-
vival may also carry implications of growing and prospering to meet
competitive pressures and novel customer demands. Given the
importance of retained earnings for such expansion, creating a cus-
tomer (Drucker, 1977, 2007) is a corporate objective that is compat-
ible with constrained profit maximization, as long as a customer is
understood as a buyer who displays sufficient loyalty to the firm
over time to enable it to achieve its financial objectives. Customer
creation is a more concrete objective than either profit maximization
or long‐term survival, but it is a contributor to both.
Spulber's equation of owners with shareholders is problematical;
however, among others, Fama (1980) and Mäntysaari (2012) point
out that shareholders are not owners. The assets of the firm are
not owned by shareholders nor are shareholders unique in providing
capital to the firm or in shouldering risk. If, however, we assume that
certain stakeholders in the firm have objectives that are different
from the firm's objective of profit maximization—shareholders, man-
agers, and other employees, for instance, whose consumption objec-
tives may nevertheless lead them to prefer to be associated with a
profit maximizing firm—then the essence of Spulber's definition of
the firm may be retained. It is natural of course to ask, is it not
the goal of the managers and other employees of the firm for it to
survive and prosper through the creation of a customer, because
their efforts are entirely directed toward this objective because that
is the whole point of the marketing firm? Or that of its shareholders,
given their dependence on the achievement of profitable sales? Not
in the same sense as for the firm. Each of these stakeholder groups
performs functions that contribute to the creation of a customer, but
their overriding motivation is consumption. They presumably prefer
that the firm maximize profits through the appropriate corporate
response to the imperatives of marketing‐oriented management.
But that is a necessary prerequisite of their attaining their consump-
tion desires. The firm's objective, by contrast, is not consumption.
Firms do consume“raw materials and other inputs, for instance—
but this is not their existential motivation.
This conclusion has certain implications for the nature and operation
of marketing firms that serve to separate them from consumer organi-
zations whose members' objectives are not distinguishable from those
of the association or enterprise as a whole. There are several further
considerations, however, that must be clarified before we can make
the objective of the marketing firm more concrete.
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Most public bodies are monopolies or work harmoniously and comple-
mentarily with similar organizations. Firms, by contrast, are rivals, bound
by strategic ambition and antitrust legislation to avoid cooperation
unless this is authorized as a joint venture for instance. Operatingwithin
an affluent, open market place is a prerequisite of the pursuit of
marketing‐oriented management, which permits the firm scope to
determine (via consumer sentiment) its business domain and mode of
working. Firms as Spulber understands them require this. But some
organizations, which are often said to practice marketing, are incapable
of engaging in marketing‐oriented management in the sense under-
stood in this paper. Social marketing campaigns, for instance, are not
firms in Spulber's sense because the objectives of the organizations
involved do not differ from those of the owners/members. Moreover,
bodies engaged in “social marketing” do not have a product or service,
which is literally exchanged in pecuniarymarkets, or do not use a compet-
itive price mechanism. By and large, they have an amorphous output
such as “smoking reduction” (rather than a concrete product or service
that can participate in legal transfer for financial consideration). Public
enterprises do not always compete and do not necessarily set prices
or determine the business they are in autonomously; they may not
exchange freely in markets because they are affected more or less by
interventionist government policies.4.3 | Marketing transactions
The marketing firm seeks to effect marketing transactions based on
exchange and thereby creating customers. Marketing transactions
entail literal exchange or transfer of legal title. A marketing transac-
tion comprises mutual reinforcement based on literal exchange. In a
marketing relationship based on economic exchange, the mutual
reinforcement is typically accomplished by an item‐for‐item switch
of valued items. The requirement that marketing transactions be
understood as literal transfers entails that marketing firms operate
in pecuniary markets. Each party to a marketing relationship provides
the other with utilitarian and informational reinforcement: Typically,
goods that supply functional and social utilities are traded for
money and marketing intelligence. The marketing intelligence pro-
vided by customers, information about what they have bought and
their experience of it and their plans for the future, provides infor-
mational reinforcement that guides the marketer's strategic planning
and marketing management activities. The literalness of exchange in
typical pecuniary trading is easily discerned, but the question arises
what is actually exchanged in the case of intangibles such as ser-
vices: The essence of a marketing transaction is mutual transfers of
legal title to a product or the outcome of a service. Such
exchange is a transfer of property rights (see, inter alia, Commons,
1924; Demsetz, 2014; Posner, 1995). Legal entitlement and contrac-
tual obligations are elements of the contingencies of reinforcement
and punishment, which influence behavior, just as the market itselfis ultimately a source of mutually accepted and reciprocally binding
contingencies (Foxall, 1999).5 | THE MARKETING FIRM: STRUCTURE
5.1 | The firm as a metacontingency
As a school of psychological science, behavior analysis has traditionally
employed a single‐subject unit of study. However, the theory of the
marketing firm argues that an organization's behavior, although it
diverges from the aggregated actions of its members, can nevertheless
be understood in operant terms (Foxall, 1999). Whereas an individual's
behavior is typically predicted within an experimental paradigm accord-
ing to the three‐term contingency, an organization's behavior reflects its
structure as a system of interlocking behavioral contingencies. The oper-
ant nature of the supraindividual behavior of the organization is inferred
from the consequences or outputs it generates over and above the
aggregate behaviors of its members and the effects of the organization's
behavior, which is greater than the sum of its parts, on its subsequent
conduct. Biglan and Glenn (2013) speak of the relationships between
interlocking behavioral contingencies, their products (or outputs), and
the rewarding or punishing consequences enjoined by their external
environments on these products, as metacontingencies. The
suprapersonal behavior of the marketing firm consists in the marketing
mixes that it generates, launches into the marketplace, and subse-
quently manages through their life cycles. The accent that the theory
of the marketing firm places on exchange relationships as central to
marketing transactions suggests themechanism bywhich themarketing
firm and its customer base are bound together, namely, the concept of
bilateral contingency, to which we shall return (Foxall, 1999, 2014b,
2015).
The metacontingency concept is a means of describing the interac-
tions of individual consumers with firms, and of firms with other firms,
as based on interwoven contingencies. Each entity is a contextual sys-
tem in its own right, its behavior predictable from its learning history
and behavior setting (Foxall, 2018). The idea of themarketing firm rests,
moreover, on a distinction between the behavioral outputs of organiza-
tions that are metacontingencies and those of collectivities of persons
who may form the firm's customer base (Foxall, 2015; see also Biglan
& Glenn, 2013; Houmanfar, Rodrigues, & Smith, 2009). Hence, the
import of a firm as ametacontingency derives from its behavioral output
having emerged from, but nevertheless over and above, the combined
actions of its members. This renders the output of the metacontingency
qualitatively different from the aggregated behaviors of its members.
Such metacontingent corporate behavior evolves in its own right as its
consequences are selected or deselected by the environment, in this
case, by the firm's customers and potential customers, who respond to
themarketingmixes it presents. The behavioral output of the firm's con-
sumers is, in contrast, the aggregated consequences of their several
actions. Although it is possible to perform statistical operations on mea-
sures of this behavior, as though it were an entity in its own right, it
remains no more than a combination of individual operant responses
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not evolve: Its future prevalence is not sensitive to any environmental
consequences that it generates into because it produces no behavioral
outputs in addition to those of consumers enmasse that can be differen-
tially acted on by a selective environment. Such behavior, the actions
of a large collectivity, is termed macrobehavior (Glenn, 1991, 2004).
The marketing firm's output is the marketing mix—not a product
alone but a fusion of product and nonproduct instruments available to
the firm to attempt to influence demand andwhich acts as a single entity
to create a customer. For what produces sales is not the product alone
or advertising alone but the mix of elements that the firm has at its dis-
posal to convert consumer wants into consumer demand: product,
price, promotion (including advertising), and place (representing distri-
bution utilities). Therefore, comprehensive marketing mix management
is a mandatory component of the output of themarketing firm in a com-
petence theory for it is the marketingmix as a unified entity that creates
customers. The kind of firm we are considering is only competent to
market successfully if it employs all four elements of the marketing
mix in optimal fashion. Social marketing campaigns by contrast rely
heavily on persuasive communication” in fact for many, this is the sole
element of the marketing mix employed. The deployment of a commu-
nications strategy is notmarketing, and clearly, it does not entail market-
ing mix management.5.2 | A nexus of bilateral contingencies
Bilateral contingency analysis concerns the overt relationships
between the marketing firm and a customer, either a final consumer
or a corporate purchaser (Figure 4). (Note that the bilateral contingen-
cies that link the firm, its stakeholders, and consumerates include con-
tractual relationships, e.g., between the firm and its customers, or the
firm and its employees, and noncontractual relationships among all
these parties that are both commercial and social in nature. The latter
are termed “mutuality” relationships; see Foxall, 1999.) The task of
marketing management is to plan, devise, and implement marketingFIGURE 2 Bilateral contingencymixes that deliver satisfactions for the firm's customer base that are
profitable for the firm. The components of the marketing mix (product,
price, promotion, and place utilities) appear in the marketplace initially
as discriminative stimuli for the consumer behaviors of browsing, pur-
chasing, and consuming. Purchasing includes the exchange of money
for the ownership of the legal right to a product or service, and this
pecuniary exchange acts as a source of both utilitarian reinforcement
(in the form of resources that can be paid out or reinvested) and infor-
mational reinforcement (in the form of feedback on corporate perfor-
mance) for the marketing firm. The efficacy of Rm (managerial
behavior) in fulfilling the professional requirements of marketing man-
agement, namely, the creation of a customer who purchases the prod-
uct at a price level sufficient to meet the goals of the firm, is
determined by the generation of profit and reputation for the firm
(depicted by the dotted diagonal line in Figure 2.) This consumer
behavior (Rc) also provides discriminative stimuli for further marketing
intelligence activities, marketing planning, and the devising and imple-
mentation of marketing mixes that respond to the stabilities and/or
dynamic nature of the behavior of the customer base (Foxall, 1999,
2014; Vella & Foxall, 2011). At this level of market interaction
between the enterprise and its customer base, managerial behavior
can be viewed as maximizing a utility function, comprising a combina-
tion of utilitarian reinforcement and informational reinforcement. The
firm is embedded in a nexus of bilateral contingencies and the man-
agement of multilateral contingencies lies at the heart of its adminis-
trative task. This is not to say that the firm is coterminous with such
a nexus but that it provides the nucleus of a network of interrela-
tionships among its stakeholders.6 | THE MARKETING FIRM: FUNCTIONS
6.1 | The management of strategic scope
The management of the strategic process is that of the firm's strategic
scope, defined by the range of marketing mixes a firm can support and
FIGURE 3 Strategic scope. Strategic scope defines the marketing mixes the firm can support and the consumerates it can serve with them
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achieve its objectives of survival and profit maximization (Figure 3).
Achieving a strategic scope that attains these objectives imposes three
obligations on firms each of which demands specific informational
inputs and decision outputs. The resulting spheres of operation are
the creation of marketing intelligence, which typically involves market
search and managerial response and reveals the potential (feasible)
strategic scope of the firm given capabilities and resources, and the
formulation of marketing strategy, concerned to determine the planned
strategic scope of the firm, namely, the markets it will serve, the mar-
keting mixes with which it will seek to accomplish this, and expecta-
tions of further diversification and innovation. Another way of
saying this is that it is an activity that determines the potential strate-
gic scope of the firm that the organization plans to achieve and it
involves the detailed planning of the selection of product‐market
scope of the firm and how it will be resourced, and marketing mix man-
agement, the planning and implementation of the portfolio of market-
ing mixes through which the firm will seek to achieve its objectives
developed in the course of the first two stages. This determines the
revealed or effective strategic scope of the firm.6.2 | Response to marketing incompleteness
Before expanding on the procedures involved in these resource‐based
operations that constitute the firm's strategic process, it is useful to
introduce the concept of market incompleteness. We have seen that
for Bylund, incompleteness involves splitting a productive stage gen-
erating partly finished goods for which there is no market: The pro-
ducer has to either obtain partly completed inputs in order to
complete it in‐house or find a market for a partly finished product that
does not readily exist. This is the source of the specialization deadlock
because extramarket specialization results in uncertainty, a state ofaffairs that, as we saw, accords with Adam Smith's statement that
the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market.
The case of market incompleteness is of a different kind. The
strategic scope of the firm depends on the assets, productive and
marketing, at its disposal. These are assets that only have value if
they are protected from plagiarism by competitors. The tasks they
entail may be undertaken as discrete operations but they are continu-
ous rather than disjointed, and their holistic management is vital to the
firm's strategic planning and determination of strategic scope.
They therefore must be confined (kept within an organizational
boundary) and classified (available only to trusted and interested
parties), and their implementation in the market is strictly controlled.
Marketing incompleteness is revealed and responded to by means of
the deployment of these assets and the firm's response to them.
Market incompleteness is a gap in the market revealed through market
search, evaluated by the application of marketing intelligence
within the strategic scope of the firm, and responded to through the
application/extension of the strategic scope leading to effective
marketing mix management that makes clear the actual strategic
scope of the firm.146.2.1 | Creation of marketing intelligence
Possible incompleteness in the market is revealed by market search
(confined necessarily within the strategic scope of the firm, though
one would hope with an eye to extraneous opportunities too). By
revealing the feasible strategic scope of the firm, this should engender
planning based on the fact that market incompleteness is the identifi-
cation of a gap in the market that can be filled by product develop-
ment, market development, or diversification (the last of which is
diversification in Penrose's terms). There may be no response neces-
sary to the intelligence so gathered and evaluated.
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The firm assesses its strategic environment by considering the market-
ing opportunities available to it and the behaviors of consumers and
competitors. This could be done with the aid of external consultants
and agents. However, planned movement in any one of these directions
reflects a change in the in the strategic scope of the firm (following on
from requisite decision making on the basis of marketing intelligence
and planning. This decision making must recognize that, although mar-
ket search was undertaken within the strategic scope of the firm, its
results and revealed potentials have now got to be rigorously
reexamined within the capabilities framework of the organization
(Day, 2011). But the planning of future marketing scope must not be
confined within the preexisting corporate policy and strategy: It ought
also to impinge on and challenge that strategic position so that it is
not a static straightjacket; if necessary, the firm's strategic scope must
be modified and decisions made with respect to the resources the firm
will employ and how it will utilize them.6.2.3 | Marketing mix management
The firm must design each of its marketing mixes as a unity of product,
place, promotion, and price. It is the marketing mix that produces
sales, not just any one part of it. It is feasible that external consultants
or agents could assist in this stage. The firm must also manage its port-
folio of marketing mixes as a single entity (Figure 4). This determines
the actual strategic scope of the firm. Marketing mix management pre-
sents a more complex task than the product portfolio management
that concentrates only on a single element of the marketing mix
(Foxall, 1984).FIGURE 4 Portfolio of marketing mixes. The strategic scope represented
the extent to which the firm consolidates its market positions or diversifies
simplicity, only two marketing mixes are shownThe marketing firm is a means of identifying and responding to
market incompleteness by altering its strategic scope (product/market
development and diversification). The point about the firm's
undertaking this is (a) to economize on transaction costs but also,
and at least as important, (b) to enhance sales (physical) and revenues
(cash). Entrepreneurship is involved in all three of these
marketing resources and the tasks that they entail. Entrepreneurship
is the identification of market incompleteness, the response to it in
light of the firm's current strategic scope, and the development
and deployment of appropriate marketing mixes that ensure that
the firm's overall mix portfolio achieves its profit objectives. This
does not necessarily mean it maximizes profit, only that it achieves
sufficient profit to enable it to invest, satisfy shareholders, and
survive and prosper. Entrepreneurship is the successful planning of
profitable (in the above sense) feasible strategic scope and the imple-
mentation of the decisions that ensue with respect to the management
of strategic scope. This can be undertaken only within the
organization.
Some general comments are necessary. First, the management of
strategic scope views the strategic process is a single entity, rather
than three disjointed spheres of operation, which as a whole is con-
cerned with the creation and implementation of the strategic scope
of the firm. Its goal and content are the portfolio of marketing mixes,
which constitute the emergent output of the business organization
that influences, first, consumer behavior and, second, the fortunes of
the firm itself and hence its subsequent behavior. Indeed, the manage-
ment of a whole portfolio of marketing mixes in a unified and harmo-
nious manner is the very embodiment of the firm as a
metacontingency, and it rests on the concept of the bilateral contin-
gencies that define marketing and mutuality relationships within and
beyond the firm.by the portfolio of marketing mixes that the firm manages determines
into novel areas. The portfolio must be managed as a single entity. For
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7.1 | Corporate objectives revisited
From the foregoing, it emerges that “the goal of the marketing firm is
the maximization of profits through the creation and delivery of mar-
keting mixes that optimally satisfy consumers' requirements.” This is
the goal of the firm but not of any of its stakeholders. Only marketing
firms have a marketing mix as their output. Other organizations, even
if they are commercial in structure and orientation, have goals that are
not distinguishable from those of their stakeholders. A nonprofit orga-
nization, for instance, has a goal that is identical with that of its stake-
holders; though by definition is not profit‐seeking, it seeks to avoid
losses, but its goal and those of its members are identical. Such orga-
nizations seek to maximize the output for which they were established
(e.g., smoking cessation), which is identical to that of their owners and
other stakeholders, including their “consumers.”
This goal is consistent with the marketing firm's being a
metacontingency, an organization that has an output over and above
those of its constituent members; in evolutionary terms, this output,
the marketing mix, is part of the sum total of variation provided by com-
peting marketing firms within which consumerates select. This process
of selection determines the shape of future marketing mixes and
thereby of the range of variation available to customers.Other organiza-
tions, even if they are subject to financial discipline, even if they gener-
ate and manage some elements of the marketing mix, are essentially
characterized by macrobehavioral considerations. Their outputs are
organizationally shaped insofar as a system of intraorganizational
rewards and punishments regulates the behavior of their managers
and other employees (Foxall, 2014a, 2014b). But their outputs do not
in themselves evolve as do those ofmarketing firms through the process
of marketplace selection.7.2 | Marketing specialization
The specialized marketing resources that are integral to the strategic
process are human: the entrepreneurs/managers responsible for the
discovery of marketing opportunities and for their planning and imple-
mentation. The specialized marketing assets integral to this process
consist in the information, intelligence, and knowledge that are gener-
ated in the course of the strategic process. Each of the stages that
comprise the strategic process has its own intellectual requirements;
the outcomes of which feed into the succeeding stage or the reitera-
tion of the process: market information, which is the data with respect
to, for example, behavior of consumers; marketing intelligence, which
is the market data contextualized within the framework provided by
the firm's strategic capacities and present strategic profile; and strate-
gic knowledge, which is the marketing intelligence that leads to the
formulation of the potential strategic scope of the firm. In the first
stage of the strategic process, the creation of marketing intelligence
involves the gathering of market information and its transformation
into marketing intelligence. This stage of the strategic process is vitallyconcerned with the generation from market data, first, of information
about current and future market operations and opportunities and,
second, of evidence that can form the basis of strategic planning, mar-
keting intelligence. The inputs are the answers to indicative questions:
What services are consumers buying? What kinds and levels of utilitar-
ian and informational reinforcement are they consuming? Questions
of this kind arise from considerations of the enhanced levels of con-
sumer choice that entail marketing‐oriented management. The
answers determine the firm's knowledge base with respect to the busi-
ness it is in. Questions that derive from the enhancement of consumer
sophistication include the following: What will consumers demand and
consume? What does their consumption behavior reveal about the
kinds and levels of utilitarian and informational reinforcement they will
require and consume in the future? The outcome of this process is
knowledge of the feasible strategic scope of the firm. The marketing
mixes it might conceivably produce and launch coupled with the
consumerates it could realistically serve by their means.
The formulation of marketing strategy is the transformation of
marketing intelligence into strategic intelligence, that is, strategic plans
based on the potential strategic scope of the firm given its capabilities
and present scope. On the basis of the marketing intelligence that
becomes available in the earlier stage, the questions that arise from
consumer choice considerations are of the kind: How are we and our
competitors responding to the market information we have/they prob-
ably have and what are the implications of our marketing intelligence
for strategic scope? How shall we design our strategic portfolio? On
the basis of consumer sophistication, the questions that arise are the
following: What will the planned portfolio require of us in terms of
resources and assets, especially marketing assets? This work reveals
the potential strategic scope of the firm, the marketing mixes the firm
intends to manage and the consumerates it plans to serve. The devis-
ing and planning of the portfolio of marketing mixes that the firm will
assume responsibility for is a vital part of this stage of the strategic
process.
Marketing mix management involves the detailed development of
final plans for the portfolio, the launch or relaunch of any novel mixes,
and the continuous management of the portfolio to meet corporate
objectives of survival through the constrained maximization of profits.
The questions that arise from consumer choice considerations concern
the outcomes of monitoring of the marketing mixes for which the firm
is responsible, the implementation of its strategic portfolio, for exam-
ple, from the standpoint of the enhancement of consumer choice:
What are the outcomes of the implementation of our strategic portfo-
lio? And, from that of consumer sophistication: How should we change
the composition of our marketing mix portfolio? The proximal out-
comes include the adjustment of the strategic portfolio; the more dis-
tal outcomes are the financial implications of having designed and
currently managing the strategic portfolio. The management process
is one of continued monitoring and progress and fine tuning of opera-
tions on the basis of strategic knowledge.15
Although Bylund argues that the specializing of (production) tasks
by subdivision can be achieved only within a firm to ensure that there
is a “market” or productive use for the output of subtasks, I want to
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reliant on strategic marketing information. These might also be readily
subdivided on the basis of a novel division of labor but that is not the
central point for the marketing firm. Such knowledge and the intelli-
gence on which it depends need to be subdivided and recombined
and managed as a whole within a particular strategic vision, and this
state of affairs is likely to be attainable only within the confines of
an organization. The management of actual and tacit knowledge can
be achieved only if it occurs within an organized framework of author-
itative control, with top management taking responsibility for the cul-
ture of marketing‐oriented management and for its implementation.
The only phase of the entire process that can advisedly involve
extracorporate inputs is the gathering of market data. The further
the firm advances through the strategic process, the more specialized
the assets it produces become, and the greater is the need of its
encapsulation within the firm. The necessity of this process, as the
required corporate response to the imperatives of marketing‐oriented
management, allied with the necessity of its being conducted under
the aegis of a firm that can protect marketing assets from competitors,
provides the rationale of the contemporary firm, the marketing firm.167.3 | Strategic encapsulation
The assessment of feasible strategic scope (via the creation of market-
ing intelligence) involves the acquisition of appropriate marketing infor-
mation and its transformation into marketing intelligence, which is the
basis of marketing planning.17 This operation enables the firm to gain
marketing research data by which to determine the segments of the
market it might realistically serve and plan how it intends to do so. It
may undertake (a) the acquisition of basic information, either directly
through its own internal capabilities or via an external specialist organi-
zation (to which it is said to commercially delegate the task). It might use
market research agencies, for instance, or simply use consultants and
advisers. But, beyond this, the ultimate decisions and the procedures
that lead to them remain its own because the transformation of market-
ing information into marketing intelligence is an internal matter.
The planning of potential strategic scope (via formulation of market-
ing strategy) is corporate‐level policy making and strategy formulation
or at least a large part of it. This is the determination of the firm's over-
arching strategic direction–the goals it pursues, its means of achieving
them, and the criteria of success it applies. As a result, (a) the firm deter-
mines its initial strategic scope (what consumerates it seeks to satisfy
and with what marketing mixes). It is unlikely that the firm would use
consultants and advisers in this regard, because it is tending toward a
situation in which the firm is about to take (b) the ultimate decisions that
will determine its strategic portfolio. Ultimately, these decision‐based
procedures are operations that can only be undertaken within the firm.
Even if they are conducted haphazardly or by default, they are inescap-
able and remain a corporate responsibility.
The achievement of effective strategic scope (via marketing mix
management) depends on the prior accomplishment of the first and
second stages.18 The firm is now in a position to (a) make decisionswith respect to the design and delivery of marketing mix (product,
price, promotion, and place) through which it seeks to satisfy its con-
sumers or other publics and thereby achieve its financial objectives
and (b) implement its marketing mixes and manage them through their
life cycles. The marketing‐managerial operations involved in these
operations must be integrated into the firm; the implementation, mon-
itoring, and management phases involved could hardly be delegated to
external organizations given their closeness to the strategic profile and
interests of the firm.
What we have identified as the unique assets of the marketing firm
may be termed intellectual marketing resources (IMRs), which are the
basis of specialization within the business organization. They are par-
ticular to very singular contexts and can only be combined in a com-
patible manner with other similar resources in the same firm. The
specialization of these marketing operations compels internalization
given the competitive situation of the firm. Acquisition of the means
of carrying out the three marketing operations we have identified
entails a kind of division of labor that arises from obtaining highly spe-
cialized assets, which are compatible only within the framework of a
single organization.
In the course of the management of strategic scope, these intellec-
tual marketing tasks are constantly made more sophisticated, com-
bined with others, reorganized, broken down, in a process of
constant compatibility seeking. There is no market for the intermediate
outputs (though they would be valuable to competitors), but all
work together to produce a greater‐than‐the‐sum‐of‐the‐parts out-
come that is the marketing plan and marketing mix. This can
only/most effectively be done within the confines of a single organiza-
tion. This process is not an exact replica of Bylund's model, but it has
the same effect: pressure toward internalization and integration. In
sum, the IMRs embody a high degree of asset specificity that is unique
to the marketing firm as a response to the imperatives of marketing‐
oriented management; the transaction costs of pursuing IMRs in the
market would include loss of secrecy. The IMRs would cease to be
assets in this case.19
The strategic process encapsulates information that is a key mar-
keting asset conferring competitive advantage: The information is of
two kinds: overt (e.g., market research data) and tacit (e.g., methods
of investigating markets, production innovations, and plans for market-
ing mix management). Members of the organization benefit, in princi-
ple, from the sharing of the tacit and overt knowledge encapsulated
in the strategic process, but they may not be the sole beneficiaries.
Overt knowledge is potentially available to competitors; tacit knowl-
edge is available only if competitors are given access to it by the mar-
keting firm. This might occur by a member of the marketing firm
transferring employment to a competitor, through industrial espio-
nage, or by other means (Mansfield, 1985). Bundles of information
from all these sources potentially (if the information is sound) provide
competitive advantage for the marketing firm. It is not clear how far
the marketing firm can protect this tacit knowledge legally: In the case
of espionage, protection or redress is possible; in the case of employee
mobility, however, it is not so clear that recourse to these remedies
would be available. Much tacit knowledge may not be transferable
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skills in the marketing firm. In addition to overt and tacit knowledge,
there are matters of intellectual property such as trademarks that will
be well‐protected by law. Although it might be argued that all these
forms of knowledge could be protected to some extent in the
decentralized market, the firm is the obvious mechanism by which to
protect them.8 | AN EXEMPLAR OF PERFORMANCE
RESEARCH
The theory of the marketing firm that has been proposed sets out the
competencies that a business operating within an affluent economy
that makes marketing‐oriented management imperative would ideally
need to possess, the goals it would need to fulfill, and its behavior in
doing so. It is neither a managerial prescription nor a detailed state-
ment how firms actually behave. One of its functions, however, is to
suggest propositions and hypotheses for research into the perfor-
mances of firms. In order to illustrate such research, this section
advances an instance of the position of the marketing firm in relation
to its market behavior that is amenable to empirical investigation: the
relative symmetry of bilateral contingencies that link marketing firms
with their consumerates and their implications for the extent to which
firms can practice marketing‐oriented management. The following dis-
cussion does not propose particular operational measures for empiri-
cal investigation but sets out a credible research agenda with the
aim of suggesting avenues of research at a greater level of detail.
The pattern of mutually contingent interaction of two organiza-
tions (e.g., a marketing firm and a corporate customer), each of which
is a metacontingency, might be thought of as relatively symmetrical.
After all, each firm has an output in the form of a marketing mix (in
the case of the marketing firm) or a corporate purchasing strategy
(in the case of the customer), which is based on a strategic process
that converts market information into marketing intelligence and then
strategic knowledge. The two metacontingencies form a superordi-
nate bilateral contingency in which a series of marketing transactions
may take place, and long‐term personal relationships come to mark
this pattern of interaction; in other words, the bilateral contingency
involved is prolonged and strong and supplemented by mutuality
relationships. Each side to the transactions comes well prepared intel-
lectually to engage with the other and to earn long‐term maximal
profit therefrom. The marketing firm presents an integrated marketing
mix: the customer, an integrated corporate purchasing strategy. This
situation, in which metacontingency meets metacontingency, may
be thought of as involving relatively balanced power relations
between the parties.
These symmetrical relationships are based on relative equality
between the transacting parties; each designs and implements a strate-
gic marketing plan by taking the other's behavior into consideration and
strategizing accordingly; each reads the other's behavior in terms of a
unified marketing mix or purchasing policy from which it can infer the
strategy of the other and respond to it strategically. Each organizationenjoys a considerable degree of control over its own behavior setting.
Moreover, each member of the bilateral contingency matters to the
other sufficiently for its long‐term strategic ends to be taken into con-
sideration. Each party provides the other with marketing intelligence,
can assert its strategic aims, and if it chooses not to transact with the
other, can wreak tangible effects on the other's fortunes. The result is
genuine relationship marketing based on a long‐term bond between
the transacting organizations.
Relative asymmetry, by contrast, would be marked by an inequality
of interaction: One party to the transaction, the marketing firm, is a
metacontingency, whereas individual members of the consumerate
are individually pitted against this organization, which is in a position
to use extensive resources to make its marketing mix highly attractive.
The marketing firm may be able to take a long‐term perspective,
whereas the individual consumer is much more constrained temporally
in her decision making. The buyer is almost certainly unable to assume
a strategic stance. As long as the potential customer base is large, the
marketing firm need not seek sustained associations with its individual
consumers, for it can attain its revenue and profit objectives even if it
loses current consumers, so long as it can attract enough new ones. It
is hardly under pressure to meet the requirements of each available
market segment, let alone each consumer. However, this might well
prove to be a myopic strategy. The high failure rates of new products
attest to the power of the customer base to dictate the fortunes of
even the largest marketing firms, the constant attraction of a new cus-
tomer base is costly—perhaps for more so than the retention of
existing buyers—and severe competitive pressures militate against
complacency. The relationship remains asymmetrical in the sense
defined, but consumers achieve a degree of countervailing power.
Hence, in an affluent economy, characterized by the imperatives of
marketing‐oriented management, bilateral contingencies ensure that
consumers' setting scope is sufficiently open to allow them to transfer
their business to another supplier.
Now, certain predictions follow from this analysis. Wemay posit, for
instance, that bilateral contingencies will differ in their stability or fragil-
ity where these are understood as the degree to which they motivate
orderly and sustained exchanges between marketers and their
customers. Industrial purchasers, engaging in metacontingency to
metacontingency supply arrangements, might exhibit more stable pat-
terns of interaction; final consumers, engaging in macrobehavior to
metacontingency relationships, might exhibit a lower degree of loyalty.
These potential patterns of relationship have been explored in a study
of the bilateral contingencies that characterize marketer–customer
interactions in the context of environmentally impacting consumption
(Foxall, 2015), and this allows some hypotheses to be put forward for
empirical investigation. Bilateral contingencies at the stable end of the
continuum are marked by close or proximal interactions in which the
behaviors of marketers and consumers are relatively united. They
involve easily read stimulus profiles (the elements of supplier behavior
that act as motivating operations or discriminative stimuli for customer
behavior are very apparent and vice versa), they are immediately acting
(especially in the case of metered commodities), and they are reliable.
Moreover, stable relationships entail genuine marketing relationships
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mix. More fragile relationships may, however, be built on contingencies
that are more remote or distal, not easily read, featuring delayed and
unreliable consequences. They are likely to rely principally on persua-
sion and to preclude the need for literal exchange. These suggestions
for investigation require additional translation into testable hypotheses
and operational measures, but they illustrate the potential for a perfor-
mance theory of the marketing firm and its empirical evaluation.9 | CONCLUSIONS
9.1 | Contributions of the theory of the marketing
firm
The theory of the marketing firm recognizes several contextual devel-
opments that are absent from economic theories. It does so by incorpo-
rating within a theory of the firm insights and findings from consumer
behavior analysis, marketing thought, Austrian‐economic analysis of
entrepreneurial encapsulation, and a range of economic rationales of
the firm based on transaction costs, principal‐agent relationships,
specialization, and the separation approach to the firm.
The first is to build on the finding of consumer behavior analysis that
what consumers do is maximize utilitarian and informational reinforce-
ment. This is the key to constructing a marketing theory that incorpo-
rates both consumer behavior and managerial action within a single
conceptual framework that brings togethermicroeconomics and behav-
ioral psychology. Both theoretical and empirical research in consumer
behavior analysis indicates that what consumers maximize is not
commodities, not attributes of commodities (as they are usually
defined), not vague satisfactions and utilities, but bundles of utilitarian
and informational reinforcement within their budget constraints. This
is, for instance, the source of the reality of interindustrial competition,
which defines the extent of consumer choice and unites consumer
behavior and marketing analysis.
Second, it recognizes the imperatives of marketing‐oriented
management based on enhanced consumer choice and consumer
sophistication. These are familiar enough to marketing specialists (e.g.,
Kotler & Keller, 2015) but absent from both economic and psychological
theories of the firm. This is a key incorporation of marketing thought
into the theory of the firm, in which the marketing firm provides the
required response. This permits the definition and analysis of the
marketing transaction and the essential components of the behavior
of the marketing firm, including the deployment of the entire marketing
mix, the objective of the firm as opposed to those of its stakeholders,
and the relationship of themarketing firmwith competitors. The bound-
aries of the marketing firm are not coterminous with its legal and orga-
nizational limits. The essential relationships between the firm and its
consumerates in which it reaches out to users and potential users
extend the entrepreneurial process to include them.Whatever frontiers
must be attributed to the firm in order to maintain its constitutional and
organizational integrities, their ultimate porosity must be recognized in
respect of the inclusion of the entrepreneurial role of the consumer.Third, it presents a novel rationale of the contemporary firm as a
response to these imperatives: entrepreneurial encapsulation which
serves to protect the specialization of marketing assets that are crucial
to the entrepreneurial process. The rationale of the contemporary firm
is to be found in the opportunity for entrepreneurial encapsulation it
offers so that the strategic process can be undertaken with confidence.
Marketing specialization, based on the imperatives of marketing‐
oriented management rather than those of the production‐oriented
firm, can be accomplished only within the confines of an organization
that allows maximal interaction among those with knowledge and skills
necessary to generate and manage the portfolio of marketing mixes on
which the fortunes of the firm rest. The firm provides a means of econ-
omizing on the transaction costs that occur with respect to these
specializedmarketing assets and secures them through contractingwith
employees and others to curtail the temptation to proliferate the
marketing knowledge that emerges in the course of the strategic pro-
cess to competitors.
Fourth, it stresses the nature of the marketing firm as a
metacontingency that is made possible by a nexus of bilateral contin-
gencies. This framework is the repository of the strategic process that
includes the creation of marketing intelligence, the formulation of
marketing strategy, and marketing mix management; each stage of
which generates the specialized marketing assets on which corporate
survival and profitability depends. All of this is a far cry from the exhor-
tations to firms to be marketing‐ or customer‐oriented, which provide
the standard fare of the archetypal marketing textbook. Rather, as a
competence theory of the firm, it makes explicit the areas of strategic
practice the firm must fulfill in the face of marketing imperatives, the
essential information, intelligence, and knowledge that must be gained
at each stage of the strategic process, and the necessity of a corporate
structure in which these operations can flourish and find protection. It
is a novel understanding of consumer and marketer behavior that pro-
vides a theory of the firm encompassing marketing as well as
production.9.2 | Relation to economic theories
The theory of the marketing firm has been contrasted, in the course of
this paper, with other rationales for the existence and operation of
firms, but it also reflects and builds upon their insights. Economizing
on transaction costs is undoubtedly part of the rationale for the firm's
existence; as Spulber (2009b, p. 316) points out, firms address transac-
tion costs by acting as intermediaries between consumers. Insofar as it
emphasizes costs rather than revenues, however, this is only one part
of the justification for firms' existing; closer to the actual situation is
that firms facilitate marketing relationships and marketing transactions
by anticipating consumer choice. This is not only a matter of cost
reduction: It is that of the firm offering an enhanced strategic scope
which benefits both the firm and the consumerate. Economizing mar-
keting costs, if that emphasis is to be employed, is achieved as much
through the creation of customers as by any other means. Although,
in Spulber's view, it is the firm that creates markets, it is in reality
FOXALL 181the interaction of firms and consumerates that create markets. The ini-
tiating impetus for a market can come from either of these parties, but
both are required in order to establish and maintain a market. Therein
lies the rationale of the contemporary firm, the attitude that distances
it from production orientation: the mutual exploitation of opportunity
rather than the elimination of threats by means of cost cutting.
The role of authority relationships and contracting is evident in the
procedures that manifest entrepreneurial encapsulation insofar as they
restrict the flow of knowledge from themarketing firm to its competitors.
Contractual obligations of loyalty reduce the possibility of overt industrial
espionage or even casual proliferation of knowledge that is integral to the
strategic process. Although the role of the firm in a network of contrac-
tual relationships is central to its operation as a marketing entity, its
participation in a nexus of endogenous and exogenous bilateral contin-
gencies is also an important emphasis. The skillful management of
bilateral contingencies, indeed of multilateral contingencies, between
the firm and its various stakeholders and its customers, and the interac-
tions among them makes for a complex task of coordination, which has
both contractual and noncontractual dimensions.
Specialization through the division of labor or capital is limited by the
extent and nature of the market, but it is through the exploitation of mar-
keting incompleteness that the contemporary firm prospers. It is con-
sumer choice and consumer sophistication that determine the extent of
the market, and these forces give rise to the entrepreneurial process,
the strategic conversion of market information into marketing intelli-
gence, and strategic knowledge. These imperatives ofmarketing‐oriented
managementmake internal planningof themarketing‐response inevitable
if the firm is to survive and prosper. The marketing firm internalizes the
specialized marketing assets it requires to compete successfully: These
may be predominantly intellectual, intangible, and sometimes tacit, but
they are specialized assets nonetheless, and perform the same function
in a theory of the firm as the physical assets of production.
Marketing specialization involves the administration of the firm as
a metacontingency that designs, creates and manages a portfolio of
marketing mixes that creates a customer, and thereby ensures the sur-
vival and profitability of the organization. This in turn requires the
firm's involvement in a nexus of bilateral contingencies which may
entail the internalization of marketing operations through the incorpo-
ration of marketing research functions, suppliers, and customers into
the legal and economic framework that is the firm (described at
greater length in Foxall, 2018).
The competitive situation of the firm is a fact of commercial life that
distinguishes this transaction institution from other organizations that
serve publics. This consideration is central to the need to maintain
strategic knowledge within the bounds of the firm. The achievement
of strategic knowledge, which is the raison d'être of the strategic
process, creates marketing assets that are both costly and specific to
particular transactions and the management tasks inherent in the effec-
tive deployment of the firm's marketing mix portfolio. Although the
tasks examined by Bylund in the context of productive specialization
are, he argues, finite and discrete rather than continuous, those involved
in the strategic process are interactive and continuous in the sense that
it is difficult to ascertain where one ends and another begins. Equally, itis difficult to perceive precisely to what ends the knowledge gained will
be put because the intertwined nature of the marketing mixes that the
firm is responsible for acts against definite applications of the firm's
intellectual marketing assets. The transactions or marketing costs that
would ensue from their loss to competitors are a major barrier to the
pursuit of entrepreneurship in a manner that is less than fully encapsu-
lated. Herein is found the rationale of the marketing firm.
The goal of the firm is to ensure its long‐term survival through the
maximization of profits as a result of creating a consumerate through
the deployment of an appropriate portfolio of marketing mixes.
Spulber's separation criterion, as I have understood it in relation to
stakeholders rather than owners, suggests that this is not the specific
goal of these groups. Even though managers and other employees cre-
ate and administer marketing mixes aimed at optimally facilitating
sales, there is a sense in which they cannot comprehensively accom-
plish this task. A facet of the marketing mix is the working together
of its elements to have an overall effect on consumer choice; the
means of achieving this productive harmony are probably unknowable
in advance and, insofar as it is an emergent property of the interaction
of mix elements, beyond the scope of strategic planning. The firm, as a
metacontingency that generates and manages marketing mixes, there-
fore, has an output that it beyond that of its members. Accordingly, it
has an objective that is not theirs. Recognition of separation rules out
from being firms those consumer organizations that pursue objectives
indistinguishable from their members'. It requires also that marketing
transactions be pursued and actualized through the bilateral contin-
gencies that link firms and their consumerates and that the entire mar-
keting mix be employed in achieving this. To sum up, the goal of the
marketing firm is the creation and delivery of marketing mixes that
are effective in satisfying consumer requirements profitably. Only
the firm has this goal; none of its stakeholders does. They may prefer
the firm to produce profitable marketing mixes but their goals are
income and consumption.
Although economic theories of the firm are invaluable contributors
to understanding the rationale of the contemporary firm, they tend to
privilege production over consumption and to restrict the scope of stra-
tegic entrepreneurship. They are not sufficiently informed by the reali-
ties of consumer choice nor by the environmental forces that enjoin a
strategy of customer orientation on the firm. As a result, the goal of a
theory of the marketing firm becomes that of comprehending the
nature of consumer choice and its implications for corporate behavior.
Neither descriptive nor prescriptive, the strategic devices proposed in
explanation are in no wise recommendations for corporate action.
Based on findings of consumer behavior analysis, consumers are known
to purchase combinations of utilitarian and informational benefits, to
which it is necessary that firms respond appropriately. The concept of
the marketing firm provides the consequent device for the theory of
the firm that must be sensitive to the imperatives of marketing‐oriented
management by adopting a philosophy of marketing‐oriented manage-
ment. The paper draws particular attention to the marketing firm as a
means of encapsulating entrepreneurship, understood in terms of the
formulation and management of the strategic scope of the firm. The
operations that compose the firm's strategic process—the creation of
FOXALL182marketing intelligence, the formulation of marketing strategy, and mar-
keting mix management—are the basis of marketing specialization that
requires corporate internalization in order to succeed.
ENDNOTES
1Notwithstanding this point, I shall, for the sake of concision, refer to
firms as “corporate” bodies.
2Her full definition is that the firm is “both an administrative organization
and a collection of productive resources; its general purpose is to orga-
nize the use of its “own” resources together with other resources
acquired from outside the firm for the production and sale of goods
and services at a profit; its physical resources yield services essential
for the execution of the plans of its personnel, whose activities are
bound together by the administrative framework within which they are
carried on” (Penrose, 2009, p. 31).
3The understanding of economic psychology on which this essay is based
reflects the view (see Lea, Tarpy, & Webley, 1987) that it combines both
economics and psychology, rather than being a “psychology of economic
behavior.”
4I employ the terms customer‐, consumer‐ and marketing‐orientation
interchangeably throughout the paper.
5An important contextual theory is that of Knight (1921). For a compari-
son of Kinght's and Coase's theories, see Demsetz (2014).
6Coase's argument about transaction costs and the division of labor are
somewhat transmuted in Bylund's account into terms of the division of
the capital stock. Increased economic growth and productivity enhance-
ment require the augmentation and use of capital that is specialized.
However, “the generation of productive capital, developed specifically
to support labor workers or relieve them of the already separate and
thereby simple and oftentimes repetitive tasks of production, constitutes
a ‘a “division of capital,” a specialization of individual capital items, which
enables us to resist the law of diminishing returns’” (Bylund, 2016, p. 27).
The quoted material is from Lachman, L. M. (1978). Capital and its Struc-
ture. Kansas City, MO: Sheed, Andrews and McMeel, p. 79). Bylund (p.
28) notes that this division builds on the division of labor and that we
can think of them as continually reinforcing one another as contributors
to productivity. The assumption is that resources are heterogeneous and
can be put to multiple uses.
7The full definitions are as follows: “Entrepreneurial services are those
contributions to the operations of a firm which relate to the introduction
and acceptance on behalf of the firm of new ideas, particularly with
respect to products, location, and significant changes in technology, to
the acquisition of new managerial personnel, to fundamental changes
in the administrative organization of the firm, to the raising of capital,
and to the making of plans for expansion, including the choice of method
of expansion. Entrepreneurial services are contrasted with managerial
services, which relate to the execution of entrepreneurial ideas and pro-
posals and the supervision of existing operations. The same individuals
may, and more often than not probably do, provide both types of service
to the firm” (Penrose, 2009, Fn1, 31—2).
8Bylund (2016, p. 62) notes that Coase's emphasis is not so much on pro-
duction per se as on the factors that are engaged to generate it. Coase
assumes that production occurs when resources are allocated and his
theory is specifically about the coordination of factors. Hence, for Coase,
production is stable although its mode of coordination is a matter of cost
reduction.
9Nor must we overlook that there are also non‐marketing cost advan-
tages that can be realized within the firm that are not available in the
decentralized market: for example, the realization of synergy, economies
of scale, and economies of growth (e.g., Ansoff, Kipley, Lewis, Holm‐Ste-
vens, & Ansoff, 2019; Penrose, 2009.)10The “consumerate” encompasses the customer base of the marketing
firm, be it composed of an aggregation of individual final consumers or
a number of corporate customers.
11Valuable insight into the philosophy and psychology of the Austrian view
of entrepreneurship and economic action generally can be found in
Marsh (2011.)
12U x1 ;x2ð Þ ¼ xa1xb2
where
U = utility
x1 = quantity of utilitarian reinforcement,
x2 = quantity of informational reinforcement, and
a and b are empirically obtained parameters.
13Von Mises comments that “production is not something physical, mate-
rial, and external; it is a spiritual and intellectual phenomenon. Its
essential requisites are not human labor and external natural forces
and things, but the decision of the mind to use these factors as means
for the attainment of ends. What produces the product are not toil and
trouble themselves, but the fact that the toiling is guided by reason”
(von Mises, 1949, pp. 141–142). I fully endorse what he says of intellec-
tuality in regard to production as equally the case for marketing, though I
wonder whether “spiritual” might be a value‐judgment too far in both
cases!
14The description of ideal managerial behavior in this section and Figures 3
and 4 are indicative only. Prescriptive detail is suggested by treatises on
strategic management such as Lynch (2015) and Ansoff et al. (2019.)
15The minutiae of strategic and tactical considerations required to actualize
a customer‐oriented approach are a matter of adjusting particular firms
to their peculiar circumstances. Although there is a large literature on
how to adapt a policy‐level acceptance of customer‐oriented manage-
ment to specific markets via particular manifestations of marketing
moves, this is not the subject of a competence theory which seeks to
identify the overall intellectual demands of such a policy. These specifics
of customer‐oriented management require the exercise of entrepreneur-
ial‐alertness by particular managers in particular firms and are the subject
of a performance theory of customer‐oriented management.
16There is nothing here that is at odds with the resource‐based view (RBV)
of the firm as far as it goes, though its emphasis on internal resources
rather than external search may suggest a restricted strategic outlook
compared with that assumed in this paper. (See, inter alia, Barney,
1991; Montgomery, 1995; Rothaermel, 2018). At some stage in the
entrepreneurial process (I would suggest at every stage) external oppor-
tunities must be investigated to extend the strategic scope of the firm.
The intangible assets I have suggested as essential marketing assets must
be kept within the firm. My emphasis is on intangible intellectual
resources that are based on actual and tacit knowledge which confer
competitive advantage and which must therefore be protected. The
RBV assumes the heterogeneity of intangible assets, that is, that they
differ from firm to firm and are not easily transferable. This is true of
such assets as trademarks and skills, but not necessarily of the kind of
information I am assuming. My information is of current marketing strat-
egies and techniques as well as visions and plans. It is transferable to
other firms insofar as competitors could immediately benefit from it—
not by incorporating it themselves but simply by being aware of it and
modifying their own plans and operations accordingly. It may not be het-
erogeneous but it is highly volatile and transmissible and of key strategic
import. It therefore lies at the heart of the need for incorporation; this is
especially true of marketing data and intelligence, strategic planning
methods and results, marketing plans, and so on. The RBV also assumes
the immobility of these resources which is true of trademarks and the
like but not of the kind of strategic information that marks out the need
to incorporate. This information could travel quickly through opportun-
ism (Williamson's “self‐interest seeking with guile”). It is not beyond
competitors' wit to divine it without acting opportunistically in this
FOXALL 183sense: They might just second‐guess what the marketing firm is going to
do, or gain information from observation of test markets, and so forth.
All in all, the intellectual resources that are at the center of the marketing
firm's competitive advantage and which compel entrepreneurial encap-
sulation provide a different emphasis from that of RBV conceptions.
17For, although entrepreneurship is diffused through the business organi-
zation, its affinity to marketing is apparent in that the strategic
questions posed by the entrepreneurial process are essentially marketing
questions (e.g., Stokes, 2000).
18The three marketing operations are iterative and interactive. It could be
argued that marketing strategy formulation precedes marketing intelli-
gence and planning. The point is that all three are continuing conjoint
interdependent procedures.
19Land, labor, and capital are the obvious factors of production, but so is
strategic knowledge which provides an entrepreneurial dimension of
the factors of production“in fact, we might designate this knowledge
“a factor of marketing.”
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